


NIO # 1739-76



4 November 1976

FROM DICK LETHBRIDGE
NOTE SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT
(CLIPPED)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Robert Galvin

1. I met with Mr. Galvin in Chicago on 2 November to discuss various aspects of the competitive analysis experiment. The meeting took place at my suggestion and ran for some 3 1/2 hours. In general, I feel that it was extremely constructive, that we and the PFIAB are on the same wave length in regard to the experiment, and that Mr. Galvin himself is and will continue to be supportive to the DCI and the Agency.

2. I told Mr. Galvin of the decision to do NIE 11-4-76 and of our concern that the Board understand that we were not trying to end-run the experiment. I said that in the best of circumstances Dr. Pipes' group would have been working against 11-4 and not against Chapter 1 of NIE 11-3/8. Mr. Galvin stated his understanding and asked only that I make sure that Wheaton Byers is abreast of this matter.

3. We then moved on to a status report on the experiment. I said that in my view the results so far were mixed. The team on low altitude air defense had produced a paper that had raised serious questions and had uncovered weaknesses in the A Team's report. The report on ICBM accuracy had come up with much better accuracies than those of the A Team, implying a possible current threat to Minute-man, but had used a methodology that had been considered and rejected in preparation not only of this year's 11-3/8 but of previous ones. This exercise was therefore likely to be sterile.

4. We then moved to the Pipes report on Soviet objectives. On this I said that the paper was disappointing for several reasons, although it did serve to stimulate thinking. A large portion of it

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was devoted to a critique of past estimates, an exercise that I believe the Board had already itself completed to its own satisfaction. Another part, which dealt with specific substantive areas, seemed to be based on the premise that we would make different judgments about Soviet intentions in these areas if our overall view of Soviet objectives was "more somber." In my view, this premise was philosophically untenable. The intelligently rigorous approach was to reason out from the specific to the general. Finally, I said that the report would indeed state a different view of Soviet objectives, but had not built this up from evidence as we had hoped the group would do. Mr. Galvin stated his belief that the Pipes group should not review the track record again and asked me to use my influence to have this section omitted.

5. In the course of this discussion I showed Mr. Galvin the letters recently exchanged between Mr. Cherne and the DCI, and expressed my concern that our understanding of how the teams were to be selected might not be the same as that of the Board. After an extended discussion Mr. Galvin formulated the Board's intention as follows. The Board wanted the groups to be selected from those who would approach the problem from a different point of view, whether it be "more radical or more conservative." It did not want the teams to be selected from among those whose product would be "predictable" in the sense that their minds were closed to other ideas or were unwilling to make an objective assessment of the evidence. I said that I could accept this formulation completely and that we had indeed attempted to do that in our selection of teams. In terms of the exchange of letters, it was clear to me that what the Board wanted was "worse case" and not "worst case" unless the evidence itself led the team to that conclusion.

6. We then turned to the next step after the B Teams have completed their work. I said the results so far led me to wonder whether the Board might not feel the need for a neutral "C Team" to judge the debate, particularly on the highly technical questions. Mr. Galvin said that the agreement called for an evaluation of the experiment by a group of senior consumers and that the Board was planning to do this. He said that this panel was to consider the usefulness of the experiment rather than to be a substantive umpire. We left it that this question would remain open until the experiment was complete and probably until the consumers' panel had made its evaluation.

7. I told Mr. Galvin that the B Teams apparently planned to take him up on his expressed willingness to receive recommendations from them on how the estimates process might be conducted in the future. I told him that I would recommend to the DCI that the

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B Team recommendations be transmitted to the Board through him, and that he attach his comments at the same time. Mr. Galvin agreed to this procedure.

8. In the course of our discussion of the Pipes report, I said that I and a number of other intelligence officers were becoming increasingly concerned that the analytic framework in which we had considered Soviet activities for the past few years might be unable to sustain the accumulating weight of Soviet weapons programs as we uncovered more and more of them. In other words, we could be moving toward a fundamental reevaluation of Soviet motivation. I cautioned that this was very early in the game if not actually premature, that any such change might evolve over a period of years, and that we might end up satisfied that our framework was sound. We did want the Board to know, however, that we were approaching these problems with an open mind and that our duty as professional intelligence officers was to change our minds when the evidence called for it. Mr. Galvin said he felt this was very important and that he thought that the Board should be made aware that we were at least considering such a possibility. I told him that when 11-4 was completed that we would be willing to brief it to the Board as an introduction to the problem. We could not pre-judge how the estimate would finally come out, but that between the estimate and its dissents the full range of contentious issues would be expressed.

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10. Finally, Mr. Galvin asked me to convey the substance of our meeting to Mr. Byers and through him to Mr. Cherne.

[REDACTED]

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Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Robert Galvin

D/DCI/NI:RLehman:lm (4 Nov 76)

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- 1 - Wheaton Byers/PFIAB
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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D/DCI/NI:RLehman:lm (4 Nov 76)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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D/DCI/NI:RLehman:lm (4 Nov 76)


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FROM THE DESK OF
THE DIRECTOR



Mr. Lehman

DICK'

a good memo of a constructive visit.

at your leisure please give me

a little more feel for para 8

where I marked it.

GB 11-7-76

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pls